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Abstract: This article takes an historical approach to the rise and fall of the public 
university, relating its fate to specific developments in public policy. Particular 
attention will be paid to the United States and the United Kingdom since they are 
leading the drive the marketization of public higher education in the name of a neo-
liberal global knowledge economy. It addresses how the functions of the university 
and its corporate form are being transformed and relates this to wider 
developments in the nature of the corporation and the relation between business 
and citizenship (or, market and democracy).  
 
Keywords: citizenship, corporation, markets, neo-liberalism, professions, and social 
rights 
 
  
Let me begin with an admission: the idea of the public university is itself rather 
imprecise.1 In the US, it can be traced back to the ‘land grant’ universities of the mid-
nineteenth century, and, in England, to the civic universities of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. Scotland, for its part, had a separate civic tradition that 
has an earlier origin and has been particularly important in the export of higher 
education institutions within the British Empire. Otherwise, universities in both the 
US and the UK have had varied foundations and histories; these range from religious 
foundations serving the education of the clergy to private institutions serving elites, 
as well as technical institutions serving vocational professions, and even separate 
racial groups, as in segregated educational institutions in the US. The most recent 
development has been the rise of for-profit providers of higher education, especially 
in the ‘global South’, though these are now also increasingly important (and 
growing) in the US and UK. It is this latter phenomenon, alongside that of revenue-
generating ‘satellite’ campuses of US and UK universities operating in other 
countries together with increasing cross-border flows of students, that constitutes 
the ‘globalisation’ of higher education (Nelson and Wei, 2012; Universities UK 2014; 
Kennedy 2015). 
 
These wider histories are largely outside the purview of this article. My interest is in 
post-second-world-war developments of higher education, associated with its great 
expansion, both in the US and the UK. Perhaps, of the two, only the UK can be 
characterized as having developed a system of public higher education. This was the 
explicit intention of the Robbins Report (1963) and it created a single public 
                                                        
Notes: 
 
1 For a discussion of the idea of a public university as an expression of Dewey’s idea 
of the public, see (Author A 2011). 
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university system that included the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 
notwithstanding their different status and additional private endowments. The 
Robbins’ ambition to include local authority colleges (‘polytechnics’), however was 
blocked until they were granted University status in 1992 (hence, the designation 
‘post 92’, or ‘new’ universities). In this way, the Robbins Report mirrored the 
California ‘Master Plan’ of Clark Kerr with its integrated system of research 
universities, state universities and community colleges, although it took longer to 
bring to fruition in the UK, while private institutions like Stanford and USC remained 
outside California’s ‘Master Plan’.  
 
At the same time that Lord Robbins delivered his report to the British parliament, 
Clark Kerr, President of the University of California, delivered his Godkin lectures on 
the ‘uses’ of the university (Kerr 2001). He spoke of the transformation of the 
university into a ‘multiversity’, using this term to indicate the different functions 
(‘uses’), of the modern university and how it had been transformed from a single 
community into a multiplicity of constituencies. Kerr was also clear that while 
modern universities (and especially their academic constituency) were jealous of 
their autonomy, they were also highly adaptive institutions. Most of the changes had 
taken place as a consequence of changes in the wider social environment, to which 
the university had adjusted. This frequently gave rise to conflict within the 
university, just in so far as the interests of its different constituencies were 
associated with shifts in the valuation of different activities (for example, with regard 
to rewards of promotion, status and the like).  
 
Notwithstanding the greater pluralism of US higher education (deriving from its 
federal system of government, in contrast to the highly centralized government of 
the UK),2 there was general agreement that what had emerged in the post-war 
period in both countries was a differentiated set of institutions with more-or-less 
ordered relations among them. The distinctive feature of this complex was the 
central role of the ‘research university’, involving increasing interconnections 
between the university and the wider economy and society.3 At the same time, the 
                                                        
2 This changed after the creation of devolved assemblies in 2000, such that central 
Government policy for higher education applies only to England, with Wales, 
Northern Ireland and Scotland having separate jurisdiction. Recent radical reforms, 
involving the marketization of higher education, apply primarily to England.  
 
3 The Robbins Report identified four aims, or public benefits, that warrant public 
higher education. These are the public benefit of a skilled and educated workforce 
(1963: para 25), the public benefit of higher education in producing cultivated men 
and women (1963: para 26), the public benefit of securing the advancement of 
learning through the combination of teaching and research within institutions (1963: 
para 27), and the public benefit of providing a common culture and standards of 
citizenship (1963: para 28). The Report commented that, “The system as a whole 
must be judged deficient unless it provides adequately for all of them” (1963: para 
29). 
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expansion of student numbers and the importance of higher education in providing 
credentials on the job market also gave universities an important role in securing 
‘equal opportunities’. The ‘massification’ of higher education is itself associated with 
democratization, although as we shall see later, it is not its defining feature.  
 
Universities previously associated with elite social reproduction, such as the 
Universities of Oxford and Cambridge and the US ‘ivy league’ colleges, sought to 
transfer that elite status into research activities, while also presenting themselves as 
providing access to superior employment opportunities in a purportedly meritocratic 
system of recruitment.4 The expansion of free, public higher education was believed 
by Robbins to mitigate the effects of a mixed system of public and private secondary 
education, potentially giving rise to the decline of the latter and with it the 
‘sponsored’ form of mobility that, according to Turner (1960), stood in contrast to 
the US form of ‘contest’ mobility. 
 
Kerr, more than Robbins, was conscious of the potential difficulties that were on the 
horizon for universities and, indeed, he returned to these problems in essays written 
for subsequent editions of his book. The fact that the expansion of the university 
system, in both its research and teaching aspects was associated with increased 
public funding made it subject to increasing political scrutiny, which, from the 
perspective of its members, was a potential encroachment on autonomy, as has 
recently also been argued by Ginsberg (2011) and Nussbaum (2010). In addition, the 
expansion of public higher education was not a simple extension of arguments that 
had justified public secondary education and its compulsory nature. The latter was 
universal in character and, therefore, could be represented as a ‘social right’ that 
secured a public benefit, namely a common education for citizens, a benefit 
recognized even by Milton Friedman (1962). The Robbins approach was generous – 
“courses of higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by 
ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so” (1963: para 31) – but 
participation was not intended to be universal, merely to be expanded (in the UK 
case, closer to the level already attained in the US).  
 
In this context, there was potentially the issue that higher education secured a 
private benefit for those who graduated from it, when compared with those that did 
not. At the same time, no matter how much participation might be widened, it 
would be likely to attract proportionally more of its participants from socially 
advantaged backgrounds. However, at the time, there was a general expectation of a 
shift from an industrial to a post-industrial, knowledge-based economy, where there 
would be increased demand for educated labour and a general ‘adaptive upgrading’ 
of all jobs. Indeed, this was evident in the way in which a secular trend in the 
reduction of inequalities was regarded as ‘institutionalised’ across most Western 
societies, even if the level of inequalities was significantly greater in some (the US, 
                                                        
4 Of course, elite universities can also sustain an ethic of social responsibility, 
through ‘continuing’ education and other forms of outreach such as was represented 
by the ‘settlement movement’. 
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for example) than in others (Sweden, or the UK up until the 1980s). In effect, this 
was endorsed as ‘fact’ by Kuznets (1953) and his ‘curve’ demonstrating declining 
income inequality with economic growth. 
 
Public spending on higher education, then, could be justified in terms of its wider 
benefits; even if an individual’s educational attainments and preferences did not 
take him or her to university, there would be a benefit from the greater integration 
of higher education and the economy. In other words, higher education was part of a 
wider political economy underpinned by social rights (See, Author Holmwood and 
Bhambra 2012). Nor was there perceived to be an insuperable conflict between the 
market and social rights. In this context, Robbins and Kerr were reflecting a general 
consensus (or at least consensus among political and policy elites) about the value of 
university education.  
 
This all may strike some readers as somewhat passé and of historical interest only. 
Indeed, Thomas Piketty’s (2014) landmark book on inequality, Capital in the Twenty-
First Century, makes explicit what was already becoming increasingly evident, 
namely, that the period in which we are interested is associated with a high water 
mark in public spending and the reduction of wider inequalities from which there 
has been a very considerable retreat. For Piketty, and most other commentators, 
this period of positive amelioration came to an end in the 1980s with inequalities re-
emerging until their range has now returned to that of the late nineteenth century. 
For Piketty, capitalism has once again taken a patrimonial form in which inherited 
wealth and inherited social position predominate, notwithstanding a continued 
emphasis in political rhetoric upon social mobility and equal opportunities.  
 
Piketty, of course, is a critic of the wider patterns of growing inequality and argues 
for a return to progressive taxation, especially on wealth and high incomes. At the 
same time, he also sees education as a significant mitigating factor. In effect, this is a 
return to arguments that underpinned higher education’s expansion, 
notwithstanding that it is now subject to the same pressures on public financing and 
the extolling of market-based policies that are associated with the very widening of 
inequality that is the object of his concern. How can universities, and higher 
education more generally, be part of the solution to problems of inequality if, at the 
same time, they exemplify (and exacerbate) the very processes that are at issue?  
 
This is the most fundamental dilemma that now faces all who work in higher 
education, or are interested in its future. It is my view that the rise of the public 
university represents a specific moment in the development of citizenship and its 
decline, therefore, should be understood primarily as a problem in the institutions of 
citizenship. It is to these issues that I now turn, seeking to understand the recent 
trajectory of higher education in the context of sociological theories of modernity 
across the same period, especially theories of the public sphere.  
 
 Universities and the public sphere 
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The idea of the public sphere as a site of the exercise of practices of citizenship has a 
particular association with Habermas (1989) and his study of the construction of the 
bourgeois public sphere in early capitalism.  McCarthy, who provides an introduction 
to the book, usefully summarises the concept (or category) as, “a sphere between 
civil society and the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general 
interest … [came to be] … institutionally guaranteed” (1989: xi). What is significant 
about the definition is that it stresses processes of opinion formation separately 
from mechanisms of political representation through institutions of the state. At the 
same time, it situates them between political representation and the other activities 
of members of society expressed through private voluntary associations, including 
the market exchanges of emerging capitalism.  
 
The public sphere, then, is distinct from both market and the state and a potential 
problem arises if it is reduced to either. There is an obvious tension between the 
market and the public sphere, in so far as the former is also a means of aggregating 
‘wills’ for which a ‘general interest’ might be claimed without that interest being a 
product of active (for Habermas, uncoerced) dialogue. In this case, Habermas 
suggests that we can understand such a ‘general interest’ to be ‘instrumentalised’, 
or ‘naturalized’ through claims of market necessity as a kind of ‘second nature’.5 
However, given that Habermas is treating the emergence of the (bourgeois) public 
sphere alongside the capitalist market economy, his initial orientation is the 
development of an autonomous public sphere free of domination by political 
authority (and associated religious authority) through which demands for political 
representation and reformed (democratic) political institutions can be articulated.  
 
Of course, the public sphere was limited in terms of those who were assigned 
membership, or presence within it. While expressed in terms of the civil and political 
rights of a political community of ‘equals’, equality was always a restricted category - 
for example, on the grounds of race, class and gender. In that context, the ‘general 
interest’ was the interest of some exercised against others. Nonetheless, struggles 
against domination occurred by entering the public sphere as a site where rights 
could be redefined and demanded. In other words, the public sphere was a space in 
which demands could be made and negotiated as part of the process of the reform 
of institutions; democratization, thereby, is properly understood in this context as 
both process and institution. 
 
Subsequently, writers – including Habermas – have addressed the rise of capitalist 
mass media corporations, market research, and the manipulation of public opinion 
associated with the public sphere under conditions of mass democracy. What is 
striking about a range of studies devoted to such topics, however, is that the 
university is largely absent from discussion, notwithstanding its status as the site of 
                                                        
5 The market is more usually expressed by market advocates as a sphere of liberties 
grounded in property rights, where the concern is to limit government infringement 
on those liberties which may potentially derive from pressures from the public 
sphere. See, for example Tomasi (2012). 
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academic knowledge claims about the public sphere. To be sure, there was a flurry 
of publications around the student protests and movements of the 1960s (for 
example, Habermas 1970), but this did not give rise to any sustained treatment of 
the university’s role in the public sphere. For example, there is no discussion of the 
university in Habermas’s original text, nor in Mayhew’s (1997) later treatment of 
political rhetoric and professional communication, nor in Honneth’s (2014[2011]) 
recent discussion of the social foundations of democratic life.  
 
For most writers within the critical tradition, it can be inferred that the primary issue 
is that of the ‘autonomy’ of the university and this is largely constructed around the 
problem of external political direction. Even where writers are conscious of the way 
in which the university is increasingly tied into a corporate economy, the problem is 
still addressed from the political, rather than the economic side. Thus, in Habermas’s 
(1975) early discussion of the topic, the problems of late capitalism required the 
stabilizing interventions of a welfare state and the university was understood as part 
of that new administrative complex and as politically constrained toward 
instrumental purposes. This represented the university as part of a more general 
problem of the public sphere, but it did not involve identifying it as having specific 
characteristics of its own in relation to that public sphere.  
 
Equally importantly, there was also a problem of how Habermas (1975) 
characterized the relation between the state and the economic aspects of civil 
society through his idea of ‘administered capitalism’. Both state and market are 
associated with steering mechanisms, where the broader problem is the reduction of 
the lifeworld – as the sphere of values – to the instrumental mechanisms of the 
‘system’, namely those of bureaucracy and the market. In other words, such steering 
mechanisms are not understood to be embedded in values and determined by them. 
There is no space in the analysis for the representation of the growth of the welfare 
state as the realisation of values – for example, social rights – as distinct from seeing 
it as functioning to stabilise a capitalism deemed to be problematic from the 
perspective of claims to social justice. Habermas (1992) comes closest to addressing 
issues of social rights in his engagement with Rawls (1993) who, in effect, 
incorporates them into his theory of social justice. However, each discusses the 
nature of public reason in the context of social justice without any discussion of the 
university as an institution integral to the facilitation of public reasoning. 
 
The consequence of these arguments is that the democratic significance of the 
university is weakly understood, as is the public university as a distinct form. In 
effect, the expansion of higher education since the second-world-war comes to be 
assigned to two phases. The first is associated with the rise of administered 
capitalism and the (Fordist) welfare state, the second with a post-Fordist phase, 
which has a particular alignment with a reorganized knowledge economy invigorated 
by new disruptive technologies (Delanty 2001). In each case, the university is 
potentially ‘de-formed’ by the dominance of instrumental rationalities deriving from 
state direction in one case and from the market in the other (notwithstanding that 
the primacy of the market requires strong state direction). Even here, what is 
contemplated is the university servicing the market (for example, by providing a 
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skilled workforce), rather than the university itself being marketised or directly 
subordinated to the market.  
 
The ‘values’ that inhere in the university by which it might be defined (and 
defended) are, at best, those that are traditionally associated with its ‘autonomy’. 
But, ‘autonomy’, of course, is one of the primary claims of any corporate CEO in the 
face of regulation or market restriction. Nor does the idea of ‘autonomy’ contain a 
commitment to the democratic purposes of the university. Indeed, it has come to be 
seen as a defence of faculty interests against those of an encroaching management 
that is often seen to derive from public funding imperatives (Ginsberg 2011) and, 
therefore, ‘private’ status is judged preferable.6 
 
In the next section, I will set out how the ‘values’ that might better capture the 
significance of the public university, and, therefore, what is at stake in our present 
situation, are precisely those of democracy and ‘social rights’.  
 
 The ‘citizenship complex’ 
 
It might seem odd to begin with a brief discussion of the contribution of Talcott 
Parsons, and I do not do so simply to endorse the arguments he set out. However, 
this move is partly made possible by a recent convergence upon them from within 
the critical theory tradition. This is largely unacknowledged in the case of Habermas 
(Holmwood 2009), but explicit in the case of Honneth (2014) who regards Parsons’s 
social theory as the one which is required by a reinvigorated (critical) Hegelian 
normative theory of modernity. For Honneth, the issue is how to understand the 
different spheres of modern society – essentially, for him, those of personal 
relationships, market, and political will-formation (or family-household, market and 
public sphere) – as expressing normative values. In this way, values are not assigned 
to the sphere of a distinct and separate lifeworld, but also embed spheres otherwise 
understood as instrumental, or only ‘externally’ regulated. Instrumentalisation is a 
possible ‘deformation’, within each sphere, but it is not intrinsic to any sphere as its 
internal ‘logic’. This, then, begs the question of what the normative basis of each 
sphere might be and how they are inter-related. 
 
It is here that Parsons’ treatment of modernity has interest for Honneth (albeit he 
does not address the role of the university and education more generally in the 
former’s account). In effect, Parsons’ theory of modernity has the form of a 
projection forward of tendencies he believed to be evident in the 1960s and 1970s 
as intrinsic features of modern society. As Brick (2006) has written, this was a 
moment when a number of US sociologists believed in the transcendence of 
capitalism, reinterpreting the developments otherwise identified by Habermas at 
more or less the same time in a fundamentally more positive register. Rather than 
                                                        
6 In effect, this is an expression of interests within the ‘elite’ research university and 
is part of the process by which public universities are displaced. See Holmwood 
(2012) for a detailed discussion of Ginsberg. 
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the reduction of modern society to capitalist economy, what was occurring, it was 
argued, was the embedding of capitalist economy within modern values of 
achievement and egalitarianism, providing, thereby, not simply a normative 
grounding of the public sphere, but also of the market economy itself. 
 
Parsons broadly accepted T.H. Marshall’s (1950a) account of this process in terms of 
the development and extension of civil and political rights to include social rights. 
These refer to membership in what Parsons calls the ‘societal community’, a domain 
broadly equivalent to civil society in Habermas (see, Mayhew 1997). Civil rights 
provide the framework of the boundary relations between the societal community 
and the state in terms of issues of free expression and assembly.  Political rights 
determine participation in the selection of government through the extension of the 
franchise. Finally, social rights address the welfare of citizens, “treated as a public 
responsibility” to secure the “provision of realistic opportunities to make good use of 
such rights” (Parsons 1971: 21). Social rights seek, “to ensure that adequate 
minimum standards of ‘living’, health care, and education are available.” (1971:22). 
Parsons goes on to argue that “it is particularly notable that the spread of education 
to ever wider circles of the population, as well as an upgrading of the levels of 
education has been closely connected with the development of the citizenship 
complex” (Parsons 1971: 22). 
 
A long neglected aspect of Marshall’s account has been his treatment of trades 
union rights and a ‘secondary system of industrial citizenship’ (Marshall 1950a. See, 
Holmwood 2000). It is not simply that there is pressure for redistribution of 
resources outside employment, but also pressure to transform employment itself 
through trades unions and rights of representation and association. In part, this 
involves the transformation of an earlier status distinction between salaried 
employment and waged employment. In effect, the labour contract and its 
regulation become part of ‘employment citizenship’, with similar rights and 
protections across different occupations. This is the ‘adaptive upgrading’ of all jobs 
identified by Kerr and Robbins mentioned earlier.  
 
Notwithstanding that Parsons was much less sympathetic than was Marshall to 
framing these issues in terms of class, he does provide a similar discussion, which is, 
perhaps, more telling for our purposes. For Parsons, the ‘citizenship complex’ is 
understood as transforming the corporation, not from ‘below’, but from ‘above’. In 
effect, Parsons traces the ‘civil’, ‘political’ and ‘social’ development of organizational 
forms.  This occurs first in terms of orientation to the market, where increased scale 
introduces distinct occupational roles associated with management. This is found in 
the rise of bureaucratic forms of organization.  Finally, ‘associational’ forms of 
organization emerge. These extend throughout the societal community, but become 
increasingly important in the ‘fiduciary boards’ of large corporations. With 
significantly much less emphasis on struggle than Marshall, Parsons nonetheless 
identifies employment as a form of membership of a collectivity (beyond a simple 
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contract). Different forms of associative membership both define a modern societal 
community and interpenetrate with organizational forms. 7  
 
What is significant about this account is that Parsons explicitly understands the core 
structure of the university to be ‘associational’ (that is, ‘collegial’) and uses its mode 
of organization to understand wider developments. In other words, if the modern 
university becomes more like a corporation, this is also because, at the same time, 
the corporation becomes more like a university. In part, Parsons attributes this to 
the rise of the large corporation and the separation of ownership from the functions 
of management. This latter development assigns managers a ‘political’ role in the 
corporation, reconciling different claims upon it. In this way, management is able to 
take on the status of a ‘profession’ similar to the rise of other ‘professions’.  
 
The development and transformation of the profession was, for Parsons, one of the 
key features of associative membership in the modern societal community. 
Professions enjoy a monopoly of practice in the light of claims for special expertise 
requiring considerable trust on the part of clients who are not able to judge services 
provided in terms of a principle of caveat emptor that might operate in other 
contractual relations. This poses a moral hazard, or information asymmetry, where 
clients may be vulnerable to a self-interested professional’s pursuit of profit. 
However, according to Parsons, professional associations serve to regulate the 
relations between practitioners and clients and do so both by certifying knowledge 
and by codes of practice that establish a ‘professional ethics’ (something he 
develops from Durkheim). The point is not that the professional person is less driven 
by self-interested motivations, but that these are constrained by new social 
structures toward a reconciliation of private and public interest in terms of self-
conscious duties and responsibilities. 
 
Once again, this is an argument also set out by Marshall (1950b). In an article first 
written in 1939, but specifically selected by him for publication alongside his more 
well-known ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, he makes the point that the development 
of rights also requires special occupational groups to deliver them, namely 
professions. Under the dominance of civil and political rights, the professions are 
associated with an ‘individualist’ form of transcendence of self-interest related to 
pecuniary advantage. This involves, “the belief that the individual is the true unit of 
service, because service depends on individual qualities and individual judgement, 
supported by an individual responsibility which cannot be shifted on to the 
shoulders of others… it is not concerned with self-interest, but with the welfare of 
the client” (1950b: 140). With the development of social rights and services provided 
directly through public authorities, however, this involves that, “the professions are 
being socialized and the social and public services are being professionalized” 
                                                        
7 Significantly one of Parsons’s severest critics, David Lockwood, also comes to a 
similar view, drawing on Marshall to argue for an “institutional unity consisting of 
citizenship, market and bureaucratic relationships” (1996: 532). 
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(1950b: 147). 8  With regard to the first aspect, professions are brought to connect 
the welfare of the individual client with obligations to the wider public. With regard 
to the second, the professionalisation of services means that they are provided in a 
manner befitting social rights of citizenship.  They are provided as a service to 
individuals regarded as equal members of the political community, rather than as 
recipients of charity. 
 
To some extent, then, the development of the professions follows the track of the 
university itself. Just as the professions once recruited from those with high status 
backgrounds because they served people of a similar status (an argument that goes 
back to Adam Smith), so the university was initially associated with the reproduction 
of elite culture. However, with the development of the ‘citizenship complex’, as the 
professions are democratized, so, too, is the university. This is not the democracy 
that might be claimed by a student movement concerned to disrupt status hierarchy, 
but the latter, for Parsons, was a symptom of a shift in the meaning of the university 
and not in itself the direct expression of the meaning of the university for 
democracy.  
 
This is so not least because the university is responsible for what Parsons calls the 
‘cognitive complex’ and its normative significance within modern societies. While the 
professions are the ‘outward’ face of the knowledge society and its demand for 
specialized expertise, the university is increasingly the guarantor of the knowledge 
base of that expertise and its development through research. Professional 
associations continue to regulate practice, but increasingly the knowledge they 
certify is credentialised through universities and their professional schools (including 
business schools). At the same time, for Parsons, this means that the “profession of 
higher education, and of scholarly research, has also been acquiring greater relative 
importance” (1971: 26), along with the notable fact that the educational revolution 
has begun to “transform the whole structure of modern society. Above all, it reduces 
the relative importance of the two major ideological concerns, the market and 
bureaucratic organization. The emerging emphasis is on associational organization, 
especially its collegial form” (1971: 98). 
 
By emphasizing associational organization, Parsons is, of course, mobilizing a theme 
of American democracy that goes back to Tocqueville. Nowhere does Parsons use 
the idea of the ‘public university’ as a distinct form – in contrast, his preferred 
                                                        
8 Significantly, Marshall is more sanguine and prophetic about this development. 
Within the existing status order, business occupations he suggested are accorded 
the status of profession that are, “furthest removed in character from the 
professional ideal, in that they are most completely devoted to money values, 
money profits and speculation.” He goes on, “if one were ruminating on the 
probable alignment of forces in case of a future crisis one would have to note the 
affinities between the upper ranks of certain professions and of financial capitalism, 
and hazard a guess that capitalist interests would be the dominating influence in the 
group… But at a lower social level the picture is different” (1950b: 151). 
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terminology is the research university and the professional school, and their 
functions of research, teaching, general education and socialization. Nor does he use 
the language of the ‘public sphere’ to account for the changing roles of the 
university. However, as I have suggested, he does locate the university centrally 
within the societal community as an expression of a citizenship complex that secures 
social rights and defines overall legitimacy within the societal community by 
reconciling private and public interests. The ‘autonomy’ of the university, then, takes 
on a new meaning within this citizenship complex. Its knowledge is at service to a 
societal community in which, “The principle of equality has broken through to a new 
level of pervasiveness and generality. A societal community as basically composed of 
equals seems to be the ‘end of the line’ in the long process of undermining the 
legitimacy of … older, more particularistic ascriptive bases of membership” (1971: 
119). 
 
 Dismantling the citizenship complex  
 
Parsons’ general account is evolutionary in its orientation and generally neglectful of 
struggles, conflict and entrenched interests, as was pointed out by Smelser in a 
dissenting appendix to Parsons and Platt’s (1975) volume on the American university 
on which he had been a planned collaborator. Smelser’s sensibility was closer to that 
of Kerr (2001) and the latter’s concern about the ‘pathologies’ that might arise as a 
consequence of conflict among competing interests.9 However, my purpose here has 
not been to affirm the adequacy of Parsons’ evolutionary account, but simply to use 
it as a means of identifying what is potentially at stake in the changes being wrought 
within higher education in the name of neo-liberal public policy.  
 
Put simply, we can now begin to understand the widening inequality of incomes and 
wealth outlined by Piketty among others, as part of a process of the dismantling of 
the ‘citizenship complex’ and the re-emergence of ascriptive bases of membership. 
This is consistent with continued high participation rates in higher education which 
can also be represented in terms of a ‘democratic commitment’, although the 
explicit justification that is given is a consumerist one and personal responsibility for 
investment in human capital. Simply, the dismantling of the citizenship complex can 
be considered as a shift from ‘thick’ to ‘thin’ citizenship, not a denial of citizenship as 
such. Nonetheless, ‘thin’ citizenship will involve the return of problems that thick 
citizenship sought to resolve. So, notwithstanding a continued emphasis on equal 
opportunities, inheritance of social position has become more evident, not least in 
low and stable, or declining, rates of social mobility, against the expectation that 
                                                        
9 As Kerr observed, scientific research within the university has always been directed 
toward economic objectives, but this has been accentuated under neo-liberal 
policies to encourage greater engagement, especially through intellectual property 
and engagement with venture capital. See, Radder (2010), Mirowski 2011 and Popp 
Berman 2013. My concern in this article has not been to outline the rise in the 
commodification of knowledge, but rather to document its corollary, the decline of 
democratic knowledge. 
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modern societies were becoming increasingly open. Social rights of citizenship are 
under challenge, but this is not simply an issue of distributive justice and the 
withdrawal of a public commitment to ‘adequate minimum standards of “living”, 
health care, and education’ (Parsons 1971: 22). Another corollary is the ‘de-
professionalisation’ of public and social services, as their recipients are transformed 
from ‘clients’ to ‘undeserving’ recipients and/or ‘customers’ of services who would 
be better served by private providers.  
 
However, given the way in which Parsons also argues that associationalism is a 
characteristic of the societal community, it also involves a transformation of the 
latter, involving the greater dominance of market and bureaucratic orientations. In 
other words, it is not simply a matter of widening inequality, but also of the 
character of services and of the nature of organizational forms as the citizenship 
complex is reduced to market and bureaucracy (and from bureaucracy to the 
market). It is in this context that we should understand changes to the corporate 
form of the university, as following changes to the wider corporation as its 
‘associational’ nature is dismantled. The university is becoming increasingly like that 
of a business corporation, where its organizational principles involve diminishing its 
associational aspects.  
 
The story has been told, in part, in terms of the application of the ‘new public 
management’ to the university, but, from the perspective set out here, that 
particular narrative begins by taking the organizational principles of business as 
unproblematic (See, Dunleavy and Hood 1993, Barzelay 2000, and  Lane 2000).10 The 
new public management is simply seen as the transfer of business principles – 
essentially associated with market principles - into a different setting – essentially, 
that of public service bureaucracy. Indeed, recent commentators have written of the 
demise of ‘new public management’, or its exhaustion (Dunleavy et al 2006), but 
have missed the accelerated processes of marketization that have replaced it (or 
indeed are continuous with it as its latest manifestation). In effect, the ‘new public 
management’ seeks market proxies for the evaluation of the performance of public 
services, but, in the case of universities, those proxies are increasingly devolved to 
the market itself.11 
 
Ironically, at the same time as sociological theory was developing the idea of the 
citizenship complex as the embedding of markets and bureaucracy, economic theory 
was addressing the problem of restrictions to the market that such embedding 
represented. It is not possible to do justice to this literature here, but my main 
concern is how some of it was taken up in a new economics of private property 
                                                        
10 See Paradeise et al (2009) for a criticism of the application of arguments about the 
new public management to university governance separately from national 
traditions of higher education. 
11 This was the explicit focus of the UK Government White Paper (2011) on higher 
education in England, ‘Students at the heart of the system’ and is reinforced in its 
most recent (2016), ‘Success in a knowledge economy’.  
 
13 
 
rights (Bartzell, 1989; Eggertsson 1990) that became especially influential in neo-
liberal policy circles and as an ideology of ‘shareholder value’.  The core idea 
involved market exchanges as both the paradigm of efficiency securing maximum 
aggregate welfare and grounded in an idea of economic liberty. In this context, 
‘social rights’ are perceived as both inefficient, when they are delivered in the form 
of public services, and ‘unjust’ because they entail a restriction on private property 
rights and the liberties they embody. In effect, what is proposed is a reorganization 
of the citizenship complex around an austere concept of simple freedom expressed 
through ownership, including that of self-ownership (Tomasi 2012). 
 
As should be expected of a ‘dismantling’ of the citizenship complex on the foregoing 
analysis, this is also directed at the nature of the corporation itself. Whereas the 
‘professional manager’ had been identified as responsible to multiple stakeholders, 
under a neo-liberal conception, there is only one stakeholder – those with private 
property rights in the organization – and one objective, to maximize profit through 
sale to those who take ownership of products through exchange contracts. Here, the 
issue is how to maximize shareholder value and marketise the internal transactions 
of the corporation. One way in which this is done is by redefining what is ‘core’ 
business and by disposing of activities via ‘outsourcing’, as well as by redefining the 
labour contract. Indeed, the latter is also frequently achieved by outsourcing. Where 
‘social rights’ associated with employment citizenship were associated with the 
‘upgrading’ of labour and overcoming a division between secondary and primary 
labour markets, by extending the attributes of the latter across the labour market, 
the re-definition of the labour contract upholds employers’ rights over those of 
employees.12 In effect, this is a process of reducing the terms of the labour contract 
for all workers, except those in privileged positions, generalizing the characteristics 
of the secondary labour market to include jobs that were previously outside it.  
 
In effect, there is a polarization of jobs, which, paradoxically, has gone hand in hand 
with the maintenance of demand for higher education. At the same time, the growth 
in ‘privileged’ jobs has not kept up with the number of graduates, but the anxieties 
created by changing labour market conditions maintains pressure to secure formal 
qualifications which, if they will not guarantee advantaged employment, at least 
provide the best opportunity of avoiding disadvantaged employment (Meister 2011; 
Brown et al 2011). 
 
With the increase in inequalities has also come pressure for a reduction in taxation 
on high earners and a concern to target benefits on those who are most in need. 
Indeed, this is central to the neo-liberal construction of public policy and is 
increasingly evident in higher education. For example, where arguments about 
distributive justice were classically associated with the amelioration of inequality and 
the articulation of social rights, they have taken on a new form in the context of 
higher education, where they are brought into play as consequent upon widening 
                                                        
12 Including in the UK, the expansion of ‘zero-hours’ contracts in which employees 
must be on call, but with no guarantee of work hours. 
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inequalities. Students should pay, it is increasingly argued, because they are 
potential beneficiaries; and education is to be encouraged because it contributes to 
an economy of high earners, albeit an economy of widening inequality. 
 
Thus, public funding of higher education at state universities has declined in the US 
and has increasingly been replaced by student fees, which, in turn have grown 
significantly, not simply to replace lost funding, but as a means of expanding 
university revenues (Meister 2011). Similar developments have occurred in the UK, 
albeit with a more recent origin and more decisive effect.  In the UK, the recent 
dramatic reduction in direct public funding (by a factor of 82%) shifts the cost from 
current tax-payers to students via a system of debt-financing in which universities 
increase their revenues at the cost of the students they teach, a process of 
financialisation that began earlier in the US (Meister 2011), and which has had 
earlier analogues in other sectors (Krippner 2011).13  
 
At the same time as the system encourages spiralling tuition costs and a perceived 
reduction in teaching quality,14 it dramatically increases individual indebtedness. As 
Meister puts it, in his discussion of public education in California, “the core 
assumption of privatization-as-financialization is that rising income inequality 
increases the fear of falling behind and thus the willingness of middle class students 
to borrow more. If this reasoning is correct, … students should be indifferent to the 
choice between paying for the education premium up front (as equity) or taking on 
debt—higher tuition would simply move some students further up what financial 
economists call the ‘efficient frontier’ between being an investor and being a 
borrower. … By following the logic of financialization,[universities] could 
theoretically raise revenues from enrolment growth for as long as [students] were 
more willing to incur debt than to pay higher taxes.” (2011: 134). Although, in fact, it 
is better expressed in terms of existing taxpayers preferring that future generations 
of students incur debt, since most taxpayers were beneficiaries of a different 
‘contract’ between taxpayers and graduates.15 In other words, the dismantling of the 
‘citizenship complex’ entails new issues of inter-generational justice. 
 
At the same time, fear of debt coupled with a perceived lowering of returns to a 
degree, encourages prospective students, especially those from lower income 
backgrounds, to enroll at lower cost for-profit providers, and, of course, this is the 
intention. The majority of universities become squeezed between for-profit 
providers and more elite universities. Students from low income backgrounds end up 
                                                        
13 For a discussion of financialisation in UK higher education, see McGettigan (2013). 
 
14 The latter is not established by evidence but becomes part of the rhetoric surrounding 
interventions. For example, the UK Government White Paper, (Department of Business 
Innovation and Science 2016) argues for the necessity of a Teaching Excellence Framework to 
address teaching quality and also as a means of determining future fee increases.  
 
15 This is especially evident in the UK where no fees were charged to students prior 
to 1998 and then were charged alongside direct public funding. 
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paying more for degrees, which will do little to advance their social mobility. 
Students at more elite universities are willing to pay significantly higher fees once 
education becomes a ‘positional good’ that provides greater chances of getting one 
of a reduced number of graduate jobs. Equally, they are interested in investments in 
the student experience that reproduce the facilities associated with high status 
lifestyles. 
 
In the US and the UK, alike, these developments are justified by a re-configuration of 
students as consumers in a market for education, where they are to make judgments 
about investment in their human capital in the light of labour market opportunities. 
In this way, it is proposed that the market should be allowed to determine the shape 
of the university, the nature of the courses it offers, and, will better align those 
courses with labour market requirements. In addition, market competition will re-
shape universities as organisations and will also reduce ‘inefficiencies’, allowing price 
competition to put downward pressure on student fees while extending the range of 
fees across the sector enabling elite universities to increase their fees.16  
                                                        
16 Fees in England are currently capped at £9000, with Vice Chancellors lobbying for 
that cap to be lifted (in line with the ‘market-based’ fees charged to non-EU 
students). 
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At the same time, the internal organization of the university is reconfigured. The 
new competitive market in which higher education is located encourages 
hierarchical management, a decline of collegial organization and the ‘de-
professionalisation’ of faculty. ‘Shareholder value’ enters directly in terms of the 
entry of for-profit providers, and indirectly through the ‘outsourcing’ of services to 
private, for-profit companies offering security, estate or administrative services, 
usually by reducing terms of employment, making low paid and disadvantaged 
employment a feature of the university. This is done in the name of enhancing 
student value, while leveraging those students for revenue. Increasingly, it is 
extended to the idea of ‘unbundling’ the functions of the university through the use 
of new technologies (Barber et al 2013), especially the provision of online courses 
provided by faculty at one university to be taught by adjuncts at another. In this way, 
the university is not merely part of a wider system of inequality, it becomes a 
microcosm of that inequality. The university as a ‘corporate’ entity in the early 
twenty-first century is radically different to the corporate university that emerged in 
the middle of the twentieth. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
In effect, a new system of higher education is emerging. Its characteristics are less 
clear in the United States because the nature of the transitions have been more 
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gradual and it has never adopted a full system of public higher education as was the 
case in the UK up until 2010. In part, this article has used the English case as the 
empirical grounding of an ‘ideal type’ of public higher education and its functions to 
show the sociological (and social) significance of the emergence of what, elsewhere 
(Author A 2014), I have called a neo-liberal knowledge regime. However, it has been 
significant that the idea that higher education had been absorbed into a ‘citizenship’ 
complex in which it functioned both to serve democracy and to define key attributes 
of a societal community organized through ‘associationalism’ is largely derived from 
sociological reflection upon US experience.  
 
For the most part, commentaries on a recently identified crisis of the university, such 
as those of Nussbaum (2010) or Ginsberg (2011), have been conducted from the 
perspective of elite, research universities, where the tide of change has been 
perceived as lapping at the edges, rather than threatening to engulf them. But, if the 
analysis here is correct, the protection offered to the research university – a 
continued concentration of research funding, high faculty salaries and reinforced 
role in elite social reproduction - is at the cost of its role in a citizenship complex. 
Then the public university will truly be replaced by a university at the service of 
private interests, albeit differentiated from institutions to which functions of 
vocational training, pacification and the wider reproduction of inequality are 
devolved.  
 
Public reason in a democratic society requires more than an effective system of 
higher education at the service of democratic knowledge, but that is at least one of 
its conditions (Author A 2011). We can see this is so as soon as we understand that 
the marketization of the university replaces dialogic reasoning with market choices 
and market means of aggregating information. It is vital that we apply sociological 
understanding to the practices and functions of knowledge production including the 
universities in which most sociologists are located. 
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